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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of World War II, one of the primary motivations for creating the 
institutions that eventually evolved into the European Union (EU) was to ensure a more lasting 
peace in Europe by connecting, or "integrating," member nations in such a way that a resurgence 
of strong nationalism could not again lead to war. To this end, the EU has conceptualized Europe 
as a “Europe of Regions” through which it administers socioeconomic policies at the sub-
national level through local governments. These regional policies are also meant explicitly to 
counteract potential nationalism among the EU’s member nations. However, the governing 
structure of the EU itself privileges the sovereign nation-state, while the politics of the EU 
commonly fracture along national lines.   Therefore, the EU creates tensions not only between 
the local regions and national governments, but also between the national and international 
governments. In this manner, local administrations can find themselves aligned with 
international institutions in opposition to their own national governments.  
 
This paper explores the tension and competition of three levels of governance (local, 
national, and international), within the EU by utilizing the case of transnational regional 
institutions called “Euroregions” located along the Polish/German Border.  Because they are a 
hybrid form of governmentality, these Euroregions are a location where the conflict between 
different levels of government are played out "on the ground" through policy initiatives and 
projects directed at “integrating” Poland and Germany at the local level, and demonstrate the 
reorientation of the conception of state sovereignty in a transnational context.  
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I. Introduction 
Within its institutions and political discourses, the European Union (EU) places particular 
emphasis on the conception of Europe as an assembly of distinct sub-national localities, each 
with its own particular identity, history, problems, and potential solutions.  Through the 
administration of this “Europe of Regions,” the EU enacts its “principle of subsidiarity” and 
pursues the socioeconomic policy goals of “integration” and “convergence.”  The principle of 
subsidiarity states that a given policy should be pursued at the lowest level of government 
possible for it to be effectively administered, whether this level is international, national, regional 
or local1.  This principle drives the EU to pursue low-level institutional frameworks, and makes a 
significant portion of the EU’s governing project a process of allocating Europe’s territory in 
both physical and symbolic terms.   
 
Utilizing the “Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina” as a case study, this paper examines the 
EU’s methods of regional governance in the transnational context of the Polish/German border, 
and the ways in which it interacts with regional histories and local administrations. Because they 
produce a hybrid form of governmentality, Euroregions are a location where the conflicts, 
tensions, and contradictions between local, national, and international levels of governance are 
demonstrated "on the ground" through policy initiatives and projects directed at “integrating” 
Poland and Germany.  
 
Towns located directly on the international borders of the EU are regularly described as 
the “laboratories” of European integration.   This is especially true of towns that are located on 
the current external borders of the EU such as the twin cities of Frankfurt an-der-Oder,2 Germany 
and Słubice, Poland, the main urban center of the Viadrina Euroregion.  Because cross-border 
contact and interaction is more intensive in border regions, these regions should theoretically 
also be the locations where EU “integration” and “convergence” are first observed, and should 
act as a leading indicator of the effectiveness of EU programs.  For the EU, “integration” and 
“convergence” are encouraged and pursued by specific political agendas, and regional policy is 
one of the major mechanisms it utilizes for the redistribution of wealth.   
 
Although they are accepted as Union goals, these terms are also extremely difficult to 
define and measure.  For my purposes here, I define “integration” functionally in the terms of 
policy action.  Therefore, I understand a movement towards “integration” to be the pursuit of any 
policy that promotes contact and interaction between people and groups across any international 
                                                 
1 Specifically, Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the draft EU constitution reads: “Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only 
if and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level” (The European 
Convention 2003:12). 
2 Henceforth referred to simply as Frankfurt. 
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border shared among the EU members and accession countries.  Increased “integration” can 
therefore take many forms, including cultural events, infrastructure projects, and investments.  
 
The EU’s idea of “convergence” is somewhat more straightforward, and contains 
quantifiable terms.  The Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 outlines the “convergence” criteria 
that a country must achieve in order to participate in the third and final stage of the economic and 
monetary union (EMU) at which time the Euro currency is adopted for general use3.  These 
criteria focus on regulating inflation, interest rates and budgetary deficits. In practical terms, the 
convergence criteria should cause prices and wages to approximately equalize throughout the 
EU.  This is especially important to the 2004 accession countries, which generally have prices 
and wages that are much lower than their EU counterparts. 
 
II. Europe’s Emerging Spatial Geometry 
 
The implementation of regional policy within the EU is progressively creating a situation 
of  “graduated sovereignty,” or,  
 
a series of zones that are subjected to different kinds of governmentality and that vary in terms of 
the mix of disciplinary and civilizing regimes.  These zones, which do not necessarily follow 
political borders, often contain ethnically marked class groupings, which in practice are subjected 
to regimes of rights and obligations that are different from those in other zones (Ong 1999:7).  
 
The theory of “graduated sovereignty” outlined by Ong builds on the ideas of sovereignty and 
governmentality developed by Foucault (1991).  Foucault defines governmentality as 
 
the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its 
target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security (1991:102).    
 
Here, Foucault emphasizes the knowledge and practices that are needed to manage a 
state’s population, knowledge that is intricately related to the economics of a society (1991:104).  
For both Foucault and Ong, this conception of governmentality also encompasses an idea of 
sovereignty.   Foucault observes that in the 16th century, the conception of sovereignty in Europe 
shifted from the exercise of power principally over territory and the subjects that reside on it, to a 
complex composed of people and things (such as customs, wealth, territory, resources, and 
                                                 
3 The convergence criteria are as follows: “[1] the ratio of government deficit to gross domestic 
product must not exceed 3%; [2] the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product must not 
exceed 60%; [3] there must be a sustainable degree of price stability and an average inflation 
rate, observed over a period of one year before the examination, which does not exceed by more 
than one and a half percentage points that of the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price stability; [4] there must be a long-term nominal interest rate which does not exceed by 
more than two percentage points that of the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price stability; [5] the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism 
on the European Monetary system must have been respected without severe tensions for at least 
the last two years before the examination” (The European Commission 2003).  
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means of subsistence) in relationship with one another (1991:93).   Therefore, governmentality 
and sovereignty are concerned with both people and territory.  
 
Giddens combines these ideas well, defining the “sovereign state” as  
a political organization that has the capacity, within a delimited territory or territories, to make 
laws and effectively sanction their upkeep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of the means of 
violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form of 
government; and dispose the fruits of a national economy that are the basis of its revenue 
(1987:282).   
 
Of particular importance to the EU is Giddens’s observation that “’sovereignty’ only has 
meaning in the context of a reflexively regulated system larger than any one state,” and requires 
a system in which sovereign states agree to acknowledge the sovereignty of one another 
(1987:281-282).  This reflexive system produces a situation that allows the sovereignty of a 
nation to be a negotiable quality.  A sovereign state, by the very virtue of its sovereignty, can 
choose to give up some aspects of its sovereign power to another state, institution, or 
international organization. 
 
In response to the challenges of globalization, the “graduating” of sovereignty has 
produced a situation “whereby even as the state maintains control over its territory, it is also 
willing in some cases to let corporate entities set the terms for constituting and regulating some 
domains” (Ong 1999:217).  This is exactly what is happening during the EU’s process of 
integration.  In order to join the EU, member states relinquish a portion of their national 
sovereignty to “pool” with the Union as a corporate body, in order to gain the advantages of the 
integrated continental market and its redistributive functions. In return, member nation-states 
agree to adopt the acquis communautaire, the approximately 80,000 pages of laws and 
regulations that govern the EU, and that the provisions of the EU will supersede the laws of the 
individual nation-state.  Simultaneously, the EU’s regional policy allows the creation of zones of 
governmentality and quasi-governmentality that in some cases cross not only nationally 
determined borders of local or regional governance, but also international borders.  The EU and 
its member nations thus divide the territory of member nation-states in different ways and at 
various levels of scale for the pursuit different policy goals. These goals may be interrelated, 
independent, or conflicting, and produce a variable geometry of territory, sovereignty, and 
governmentality depending on the level of scale being addressed.   
 
III. Europe’s Institutions 
 
Even as it continues to gain governing power as a supranational organization, the EU 
continues to privilege the position of member nation-states when composing the membership of 
its principal governing institutions: the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament,4.  It is useful here to briefly examine the 
composition and function of each of these institutions.  
 
                                                 
4 For an extremely useful introduction to the structures and processes of EU see McCormick 
(2002 [1999]) 
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At the highest level, the European Council is comprised of the elected heads of state of 
the member nations and has ultimate authority over the governance of the EU.  However, while 
the European Council is responsible for the broad policy directions and political vision of the 
Union, the majority of actual policy decisions takes place in the Council of Ministers, which 
consists of ministers appointed from each member nation and has a variable membership 
depending on the policy topic being addressed.   
 
Consulting with the Council of Ministers is the European Parliament, currently the only 
directly elected and arguably the least powerful of the governing bodies. The Parliament has 
limited co-decision and co-legislation powers, and approves members of the European 
Commission and the EU budget. Due to the position of the Parliament as the only institution 
directly elected by EU citizens, there is an ongoing debate regarding the apparent “democratic 
deficit” of the EU.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that this democratic deficit also acts a 
check on the independent action of EU and therefore also acts as a protection of national 
sovereignty.   
 
Finally, the extremely important responsibility of agenda setting and the development of 
proposals for new laws is given to the members of the European Commission, made up of two 
representatives from “large” countries and one from “small” countries (Spain acts as the 
population baseline for large countries) who are appointed to five year terms. However, effective 
November 1, 2004, when the next Commission takes over its duties, the number of 
commissioners per member country will be reduced to one for all members. Including the staffs 
of the 23 directorates-general (equivalent to national ministries) under its administration, the 
European Commission is by far the largest of the EU institutions, and provides the day-to-day 
executive and bureaucratic functions of the EU.   
 
Within these intuitions, almost all major policy decisions fracture along national lines, as 
is currently being demonstrated by the debate over the structure of the draft EU constitution, 
during which Poland and Spain have opposed changes to the voting system of the Council of 
Ministers defined by the Treaty of Nice5—-changes that are supported primarily by France and 
Germany. The Nice voting system is specifically designed to continue protecting the interests of 
small countries by giving them more relative power than large countries, and has created a 
system that gives medium-sized countries (in terms of population), like Spain and Poland, the 
most power relative to their populations.  For example, under these voting rules, Poland receives 
27 votes compared to Germany’s 29, even though Germany has double Poland’s population.  As 
a result, France and Germany have championed a more “democratic” system that more closely 
links votes to population figures, a suggestion the Poland and Spain interpret as an affront to 
their national sovereignty and political position within the EU.    
 
IV. The “Europe of Regions” 
 
The process of regionalization within the EU has also established a unique governing 
regime within which individual localities are capable of expressing themselves directly on the 
                                                 
5 The Treaty of Nice establishes the changes made to the EU’s governing structure in order to 
incorporate the ten accession countries.  The treaty officially took effect February 1, 2003. 
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international level, and are sometimes enabled to bypass or subvert their respective national 
government or governments.  In the case of governing structures that are concurrently sub-
national and transnational entities, this represents a form of international administration in which 
an international governing body is empowered to work at the local level within national 
governments, rather than leaving the local enactment of international treaties solely to the 
administration of national governments themselves.  
 
In most regions, the EU roughly follows already established regions of local governance 
to administer its regional policies6.  However, in the case of cross-border regional policies, this 
system broke down due to the early EU’s (and before it the European Community’s) historical 
lack of cross-border institutions and bureaucracy for administering transnational regional funds 
and policies. To remedy this problem, cross-border “Euroregions” were established to help 
provide the necessary administrative frameworks and fill the new transnational space created by 
the EU.  Four Euroregions were created along the Polish/German border: Nysa7 (Neiße/Nisa) 
(1991), Pro Europa Viadrina (1993), Sprewa-Nysa-Bóbr (Spree-Neißa-Bober) (1993) and 
Pomerania (1995). Similar regions have also been established across the EU’s internal borders.8  
 
Euroregions are voluntary associations of municipal and local governments, but are not 
official governing bodies. Instead, they can be considered civil society institutions.  Parkin 
explains that in the Polish/German context, “[Euroregions] frequently describe themselves as 
NGOs, and from the German point of view are based on cross-border ‘agreements’ 
(Verabredungen), not ‘contracts’ (Verträge)” (2002:16).  Because Euroregions represent a group 
of affiliated local governments, they blur the boundaries between government and non-
government and are legitimated primarily by brokering the relationship between their local 
member governments and the EU bureaucracy.  Individual local governments located within a 
Euroregion’s borders are free to opt out of the association, but by doing so they loose the 
influence the Euroregions exercise over the administration of EU regional policy.   However, if 
too many local governments were to opt out, a Euroregion would cease to exist.  Therefore, 
Euroregions work on the basis of a mutual acceptance of their legitimacy to act on behalf of a 
given region by both their member municipal governments and the EU.  
 
Unlike nationally determined regions of local governance, which are represented to the 
European Commission and European Council by the Committee of the Regions (CoR)9, 
                                                 
6 For this purpose the EU utilizes the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics  (NUTS) 
system.  NUTS administrative units generally correspond to national divisions of local 
governance (e.g. German Länder, French Régions, Spanish Comunidaides Autónomas, Polish 
Voivodships, etc.).  
7 This region also includes some territory located in the Czech Republic. 
8 Some 115 regions now exist.  For a full listing, see the Association of European Border 
Regions’ website at http://www.aebr.net/.  
9 The Committee of the Regions is currently made up of 222 members and 222 alternates, and 
has no formal authority.  Instead, it acts as a consulting body to the European Commission and 
European Council.  CoR Representatives are appointed to four-year terms by individual national 
governments, and the way in which representatives are chosen varies by country. The Treaty of 
Nice (December, 2000) changes the maximum number of CoR members to 350 after 
 5
 
 
Euroregions have no formal representation within the EU government.  Furthermore, there is no 
a standard model for organizing a Euroregion, and they vary widely from region to region in 
their scope and purpose depending on local goals and the funding sources the EU makes 
available to a particular region.   By utilizing these Euroregions, the EU outsources some of its 
administrative and executive functions to semi-public citizens’ groups, a situation that often 
causes policy actions to occur in a legal gray area since Euroregions themselves have very little 
authority to make agreements legally binding or to enforce them once made.  
 
This lack of a sufficient legal environment often results in a situation in which regions 
must work around, or at least without the explicit approval of, national legislatures, producing 
the requisite “little anarchy” many local trans-national bodies find necessary for cross-border 
cooperation to work (Schultz 2002:39).  Poland even went so far as to authorize local 
administrations to act directly in the international arena. During the restructuring of its 
Voivodships in 1998, Poland empowered locally elected officials, or Sejmiki “to draw-up and 
implement regional development plans and to represent themselves directly in discussions with 
their European counterparts and the EU,” (Levitas 1999:39).  These actions, whether sanctioned 
or not, allow the bypassing of national administrations, and are enabled and encouraged by EU 
policy initiatives. 
 
In general, the EU is empowered to act on one of two levels: the supranational or the sub-
national.  The concept of a “Europe of Regions” is also explicitly meant to act as a bulwark 
against a possible resurgence of nationalism or authoritarianism in one of the EU’s individual 
member states (Parkin 2002:22). As a result, national politics are increasingly in competition 
with the EU’s project of an integrated Europe.  Although it is hardly revelatory to observe that 
that the governing processes of the EU create tensions between national and international 
governing institutions, it is important to underscore that as the EU continues to pursue regional 
policies within member states, it is gradually intensifying this pressure, especially as the EU 
continues to gain the symbols and trappings of a nation-state.  In a way that would make 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) proud, the EU has been consciously “inventing” for Europe the 
traditions that normally characterize a nation  (See Shore 2000:40-65).  It has adopted an emblem 
and flag (the circle of twelve stars), a currency (the Euro), an anthem (the “Ode to Joy” from 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony), a Europe Day (May 9, commemorating the anniversary of the 
Schuman Plan that integrated the regulation of French and German steel production in 1951, 
establishing the first institution of European integration), and perhaps most importantly, a 
European constitution-in-progress.   Furthermore, the EU also has a supranational and 
theoretically merit-based civil service, which, like Anderson’s (1983) “creole” administrators 
during the period of colonial nationalism, may be creating the territorial space for a new, 
supranational “imagined community” (See Shore:2000 125-146).  
 
V. Pro Europa Viadrina 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
enlargement, but only 344 seats are currently allocated (Germany will receive 24 representatives 
and Poland 21). The Treaty of Nice also stipulates representatives to hold local or regional 
elected office or be politically accountable to an elected assembly (The European Commission 
2003).   
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Established in 1993, the ”Pro Europa Viadrina” Euroregion is situated on the central 
section of the Polish/German border and encompasses a land area of about 6000 km2 in Poland 
and 4500 km2 in Germany (Association of Polish Municipalities 2002:89). This area includes the 
Eastern part of the Brandenburg Land in Germany (specifically the two administrative districts 
of Markisch–Oderland and Oder–Spree), and the Lubuskie Voivodship in Poland.  The twin 
cities of Słubice and Frankfurt an-der-Oder are located at the center of the Euroregion, about 80 
km east of Berlin and 180 km west of Poznań. The Viadrina Euroregion contains 135 km of the 
461 km long Polish/German border, and is located on the Rotterdam-Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow 
trade corridor, through which travels approximately 50% of German-Polish commercial traffic10 
(Euroregion “Pro Europa Viadrina” 2003). This location makes the Viadrina Euroregion 
extremely important to Polish/German, and therefore EU, integration in both practical and 
symbolic terms.  
 
The organization of the Viadrina Euroregion demonstrates the difficulty in creating cross-
border institutions, and the ways in which the capabilities of state bureaucracies are lagging 
significantly behind “on-the-ground” realities.  For example, when the Viadrina Euroregion was 
established by an agreement between the German NGO, Verein Mittlere Oder (Central Oder) 
e.V. (a conglomerate of smaller associations, trade unions, administrative districts and municipal 
governments), the Association of Lubuskie Municipalities, and the Association of the 
Municipalities of Gorzów, there was no apparatus with which to register a transnational non-
profit association, since the regulation of NGOs within the EU is the responsibility of member 
governments.  Because EU policy prevents a single unified organization, all of the Euroregion’s 
functional bodies and offices must be duplicated on each side of the border.   
 
As one can imagine given these organizational conditions, the decision-making processes 
within the Viadrina Euroregion are very complex and not especially transparent to an outsider.  
Further complicating its administrative function is the fact that the Viadrina Euroregion’s 
funding currently comes from two EU regional programs: INTERREG, for EU Members 
(Germany), and PHARE for candidate countries (Poland).  Thus, the very funding targeted at 
cooperative cross-border projects comes from two separately administered sources.  
Coordinating these funds has been problematic not only in the Viadrina Euroregion, but also for 
the EU funding apparatus itself (Dascher 2003:41, see also European Commission 2000:7).    
This problem tends to intensify a fragmentary pressure with the Viadrina Euroregion, and 
impedes the ability for the offices on each side of the border to act in concert with one another. 
 
VI. Funding the Regions   
Euroregions are funded from the EUR 10.44 billion set aside in 2000-2006 from the EU’s 
structural funds for “community initiatives” directed at solving specific regional problems11.  
                                                 
10 This traffic is through the Frankfurt an-der-Oder-Świecko border checkpoint. 
11 The EU’s various regional policy funds constitute about one third of the EU’s total budgetary 
expenditures, or EUR 213 billion for 2000-2006.  EUR 195 billion of this is allocated to the 
Structural Funds, and EUR 18 billion is allocated to the Cohesion Fund, which finances 
environmental and transportation infrastructure projects in four poorest EU countries (Ireland, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal).  For a more detailed explanation of the complex allocation of 
these funds see the EU’s regional policy website at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/index_en.htm. 
 7
 
 
The EU defines these problems as “transnational and interregional cooperation (INTERREG III), 
sustainable development of cities and declining urban areas (Urban II), rural development 
through local initiatives (Leader +), [and] combating inequalities and discrimination in access to 
the labor markets (Equal)” (Inforegio 2003:2).  Of these, The Viadrina Euroregion is only 
eligible for INTERREG funds.   
 
The INTERREG program is further divided into three subcategories: A, B, and C.  
INTERREG Strand A applies to all border regions, and its “aim is to establish genuine cross-
border zones of economic activity and devise joint strategies for spatial development” (Inforegio 
2003:8).  INTERREG Strands B and C co-finance transnational and interregional cooperation 
projects. “Strand B seeks to improve the spatial planning of large areas while strand C promotes 
cooperation and experience exchanges among those involved in regional and local development 
projects” (Inforegio 2003:8) Interreg B and C are aimed particularly at cooperation between 
member and non-member states.  
 
In addition to INTERREG, the EU created the PHARE program after the collapse of 
state-sponsored socialism in Eastern Europe in 1989 to provide aid for economic development, 
and it is the primary financial instrument for pre-accession aid to central and Eastern European 
countries.  Originally targeted only at Poland and Hungary, the program now includes 13 
nations.12 From 1995-1999, PHARE allocated approximately EUR 6.7 billion for a wide range of 
projects including infrastructure development, education, research, business development, 
agricultural reform, and environmental protection (Inforegio 2003). For 2000-2006, PHARE has 
a budget of another EUR 10.9 billion, and now has only two primary goals: institution building 
and financing investment projects (Inforegio 2003).   
 
The Viadrina Euroregion receives about 80% of its budget from EU funds, and the 
remaining 20% from co-financing by member municipal governments. From 1994 to 1999, the 
Viadrina Euroregion was allocated EUR 60 million from PHARE CBC for various projects, two 
of the most notable of which were the construction of the main building and student residences 
(EUR 6 million and EUR 4 million respectively) at the Collegium Polonicum, a cooperative 
cross-border college established by Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and the European 
University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Słubice Municipal Government 2003).  Until 2006, the EU will 
make another EUR 96.21 million available to the Viadrina Euroregion through the INTERREG 
III program.13   
 
From 1995 to 2000, over 800 small projects in the Viadrina Euroregion were subsidized 
by INTERREG funds (Euroregion “Pro Europa Viadrina” 2003). Additionally, EUR 2 million 
was received by the region from the PHARE CBC Small Projects Fund to undertake 302 
individual “people-to-people” events and activities (Association of Polish Municipalities 
2002:88).  These projects target a very specific and fundamentally social goal--cross-border and 
cross-cultural integration--and according to members of the Viadrina Euroregions’s staff, these 
small projects also have the largest impact.   
                                                 
12 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
13 After May 1, 2004, when Poland enters the EU, funding from PHARE will end. 
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Although the Viadrina Euroregion’s internal organization acts as the gatekeeper for 
determining the feasibility and funding sources for most of the projects within its borders, its 
status as a voluntary association prevents it from holding an absolute monopoly on the lobbying 
of EU funds.  In fact, Dascher observes that in Germany nearly all levels of government can and 
do participate in applying for EU funds, making the entire decision making process extremely 
complex at every stage from the EU down (2003:41).  In order to negotiate this institutional 
melee, one side effect of EU regional funding has been the emergence of a growing market not 
only for the projects themselves, but also training seminars and classes explaining how to submit 
successful proposals to the EU.  
 
VII. Overcoming History  
 
While intimately involved with the allocation of EU funds, the Viadrina Euroregion was 
not established to explicitly provide economic aid.  Instead, one of the principal motivations for 
creating the Viadrina Euroregion was to provide the institutional frameworks for cooperation and 
to promote good neighborly relations between Germany and Poland against a backdrop of an 
unfavorable historical and political environment.  The Viadrina Euroregion also adopted the 
goals of “strengthen[ing] the regional identity of [border] territories, create[ing] common 
perspectives for the future”, and “promot[ing] the idea of united Europe and international 
cooperation” (Słubice Municipal Government 2003).  
 
For Euroregions, a conception of a common “culture” and history are often utilized as 
unifying and organizing principles. Likewise, the EU itself regularly emphasizes a pan-European 
identity and history that is non-nationalist and non-ethnic (or at least lacking in nationalist and 
ethnic politics).   Shore observes that the EU favors a transnational interpretation of history to 
"combat nationalistic bias," and a historiography that "typically. . . represents the last three 
thousand years of European history as a kind of moral success story: a gradual 'coming together' 
in the shape of the European Community and its institutions” (Shore 2000:57).  However, the 
local history of the Polish/German border is one of the most potentially divisive modern histories 
in all of Europe, and is frequently cited as a problem by residents on both sides of the border.   
 
National borders are, of course, the markers that delineate where the sovereignty of on 
state ends, and one state begins.  The placement of Polish/German border has been almost 
continuously contested in one way or another since Poland regained independence in 1918. From 
1918-1921, six border wars were fought concurrently, two of which were with Germany: the 
Posnańian War14 of December 27, 1918 to June 28, 1919 and the Silesian War, which was fought 
sporadically during the summers of 1919-1922 (Davies 1982:394).  After World War II, 
Poland’s borders were renegotiated in 1945 by the “Big Three” allies (United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union), first at the Yalta Conference, which set Poland’s eastern border 
approximately at the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line of 1939 (officially at the Curzon line of 
192015) after the Soviet Union made clear its intention to annex the portions of Poland it had 
acquired in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and then again at the Potsdam Conference, which set 
                                                 
14 This conflict included lands now located in the Viadrina Euroregion. 
15 This line was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the Polish-Soviet 
War of 1919-1920 and the post World War I peace negotiations (Davies 1982:504). 
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its western border as the Oder (Odra) and Neiße (Nysa) rivers. Poland as a whole was thus 
shifted west of its pre-war position.  In the west, this represented a gain of territory that no 
institution resembling a Polish government had controlled since the Piast dynasty some 700 
years earlier. 
 
As a result of these new borders, about 1.5 million Poles were compelled to move west 
from behind the Soviet-Polish frontier, while between 9 and 10 million Germans were forced to 
emigrate from the “recovered” territories16 (deZayas 1979:58,89).  4.5 million Poles were then 
resettled in the recovered territories, mostly from central Poland and the lands annexed by the 
Soviet Union, while about 1 million residents of the recovered territories were allowed to stay, 
provided their Polish ethnicity could be verified (Gruchman et al 1959:144,136).  As a general 
rule, all of these transfers were marked by brutality, and at least 1 million Germans died as a 
direct result of the expulsions, mostly during the winter of 1945  (deZayas 1979:103-104).   
 
One of the motivations for creating a mono-ethnic Polish state was to help establish a 
more lasting peace in Europe by removing potentially problematic ethnic minorities. With the 
movement of the border, native-born residents were suddenly converted to “minorities” with 
potentially subversive tendencies, which then required, at least in the eyes of the policymakers, 
their resettlement for the sake of stability (deZayas 1979:10).  The forced emigration of Germans 
from Poland therefore stems from the same quest for stability that created the impetus for the 
integration projects that eventually formed the EU, a rather ironic situation as the EU now faces 
the very problems created by these policies fifty years ago.   
 
The history of the Polish/German border has contributed directly to two of the most 
derisive issues for EU integration addressed by the recent EU accession negotiations--the 
interrelated issues of immigration and property rights.  While Germany worries that it will be 
flooded by employment-seeking Poles immediately following Poland’s accession on May 1, 
2004 and the subsequent deregulation of the border, Poles that settled in western Poland after 
World War II have become increasingly fearful that Germans will return and attempt either to 
reclaim their lost properties through legal processes, or merely to take advantage of the relatively 
low prices of Polish land and buy properties outright.  Additionally, Poland as a whole is 
concerned that German foreign investors will buy up property, especially agricultural lands.  
Concerns such as these led to concessions by both sides during the accession negotiations, which 
have significantly qualified the political and economic integration that the EU champions as two 
of its fundamental values: the free movement of people and the free movement of capital.  
 
In the case of Germany and the fourteen other current EU members, a two-year 
transitional period on immigration will be implemented, during which national measures 
constraining immigration can be applied by a current member state on a new member state.  
These policies will be reviewed after two years, but may be applied for up to seven (European 
Commission 2002:6)--A point that is continually cited as unfair in Poland. Because of the 
potentially divisive nature of property rights, Poland requested an 18-year moratorium on land 
purchases for non-Polish EU citizens. After significant debate, Poland finally agreed to a 
transition period barring foreign land purchases for 12 years for agricultural land and 5 years for 
                                                 
16  Another 3.5 million, the “Sudeten Deutsch,” were forced to emigrate from Czechoslovakia. 
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secondary residences (European Commission 2002:14).  Gaining these concessions further 
demonstrates how the histories of local regions influence, and are influenced by, the 
supranational policy decisions of the EU, as well as how geographically localized social and 
political groups can take on characteristics that make them actors not only locally, but also on 
international levels.  Moreover, by insisting that these issues be negotiated, Poland and Germany 
explicitly demonstrate the retention of sovereignty by nation-states within the EU by qualifying 
the circumstances by which “foreign” EU citizens can own property (Poland) or by excluding 
“foreign” EU citizens from entering a nation-state’s territory and earning a living (Germany).  
 
VIII. Two Cities 
Subice was “founded” in 1945 when the movement of the Polish border divided the 
eastern riverside quarter of Frankfurt, then called Dammvorstadt, from the rest of the city. 
Słubice’s name derives from a Slavic settlement in the Middle Ages called Śliwice, which the 
Piasts lost to Brandenburg in 1250 along with the rest of Lubuska (Urząd Miejski w Słubicach 
2003:5).   After the Germans were relocated across the border, the city was resettled by ethnic 
Poles.  This divided history is incorporated into Słubice’s relatively new coat of arms (adopted in 
1948), which is half white eagle, representing Poland, and half red cock, representing Frankfurt.   
 
Both Frankfurt and Słubice were rebuilt and resettled virtually from scratch after 1945.  
In the last months of World War II, Frankfurt was designated a Festung, or fortress.  These 
fortresses were designed to delay the Soviet advance as long as possible, and to potentially 
provide the basis for a German counterattack (Davies and Moorhouse 2003:16). Like most of the 
Festungen along the Oder River, such as Breslau (Wrocław) and Küstrin, Frankfurt was almost 
totally destroyed. By the war’s end, few civilians remained in the city.  The resulting lack of 
roots is often cited as a major problem by residents and officials on both sides of the border.   
 
Four general periods have characterized the post World War II Polish/German border 
regime. By 1946, the border was effectively sealed to the civilian population and it remained so 
until 1972.  On January 1, 1972, the border was opened to limited cross border traffic, including 
some employment opportunities, but was closed again in October of 1980 as a response to the 
Solidarity movement in Poland (although not as rigidly as 1945).  Finally, in 1991 the border was 
opened to visaless cross-border traffic.  The border was officially accepted by East Germany in 
1950 by the Görlitz Treaty, but not by West Germany until 1970 when the Warsaw Treaty 
normalized relations between the two countries.  The subject was not finally put to rest until 
1991 when the Border Treaty and the Treaty on Good Neighborhood were signed between 
Germany and Poland.   
 
With relatively little contact across the border during the forty-five years between 1946 
and 1991, the histories and identities of the two cities diverged. Following World War II, social 
campaigns pursued in both cities and of the border contributed to this divergence.  Both 
Frankfurt and Słubice witnessed extensive socialization campaigns. Słubice also experienced a 
Polonisation campaign (which may actually have softened the socialization campaign) and after 
1989, an additional desocialization campaign.  The street names in the two cities bear evidence 
of these histories.   In Frankfurt, Breite Straβe became Rosa Luxemburg Straβe, Riehe Straβe 
became Karl Marx Straβe and Wilhelm Platz became Platz der Republik.  All streets in Słubice 
were given Polish names, and now such socialist classics as ulica 1 Maja and ulica Jedności 
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Robotnicze (United Workers), coexist incongruously with the socialist taboos of ulica 
Piłsudskiego (after Gen Piłsudski, who led the Polish army to victory over the Soviet Union in 
the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920), and ulica Konstytucji 3 Maja (after the constitution of 
1791). 
 
With the movement of the border, Słubice was changed from an integral part of a regional 
center to a relatively isolated small town of only about 15,000 residents. Both the historical city 
center and the train station were located on the German side of the border.  The train connection 
to Słubice was never reestablished, and after leaving Frankfurt trains traveling east bypass the 
city. It is often still more convenient for Słubice residents to cross the border into Frankfurt to get 
a train connection to cities in Poland.   The movement of the border also introduced the Polish 
side to a new language and cultural norms that had not been part of the pre-war community.  
 
Additionally, many of the settlers in the Lubuskie region were part of the kresy, or Poles 
that were from Poland’s former eastern territories, and still considered these lands (now in 
Ukraine) to be their spiritual home (Parkin 2002:9).  Initially, many Poles settling in western 
Poland assumed that their residence would be temporary, and made few efforts to establish 
emotional or physical permanence, often sending their children to live in central Poland (Davies 
and Moorhouse 2003:443). Only after 1970, was permanent residence relatively assured.  
However, the possibility that displaced Germans might file indemnity suits in Polish courts has 
not yet been completely ruled out, and in many ways the “recovered territories” remain a 
contested space.   
 
Schultz explains the construction of Słubice in opposition to Frankfurt, “[Słubice] wanted 
never to share the urban history of Frankfurt.  Słubice as border guard of the Polish ‘Regained 
Territories’ built up her own history, rooted in the pioneer period after the last world war” 
(Schultz 2002:53).  Because it was unclear if Germany would accept the new border, the border 
served a dual purpose, both to keep Poles in and Germans out—-out of their former homes, cities 
and territories.  With the liberalizing of internal EU borders, the Polish/German border has now 
become increasingly important for protecting the EU’s Eastern frontier from illegal traffic of 
both immigrants and goods.  Although Poles can now cross relatively freely, the border 
checkpoint reinforces a perception of entering a foreign place and a place of different rights and 
privileges.  It is thus a regular reminder that Poland is not quite considered part of the EU’s 
European club, or to use Ong’s (1990) terms, demonstrates an example of an “ethnically marked 
class grouping” based on asymmetric power relations.   
 
Following Poland’s EU accession, the Polish/German border checkpoints will remain in 
place for the time being, and will act as a secondary bulwark to protect the EU’s core from the 
potential threat of illegal immigration from countries further east (particularly Ukraine).  Even 
though the Polish/German border checkpoints themselves are a tremendous hindrance to the 
EU’s economic and political integration by acting as a literal barrier to trade and reinforcing the 
already prevalent perception of Poles as second-class EU citizens, leaving the Polish/German 
border controls in place is considered necessary since Poland’s eastern border has been deemed 
insecure, and because Poland does not yet conform to requirements of the Schengen 
Convention’s common visa procedures (another example of “pooled” sovereignty external to the 
EU).   
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Parkin points out that international borders and cross-border regions can be either 
locations where “symbols of state power” are demonstrated through “official scrutiny” or places 
where national borders can be de-emphasized (2002:5).  Depending on the policies applied to it, 
a border region can either be utilized to keep people apart or bring them together, and the 
Polish/German border has been used in both ways.  Obviously, the latter purpose is preferable to 
EU and Euroregion administrations, but this effort has been hindered by the concerns of national 
governments, making even the physical border itself a site where local and national policies 
compete.     
 
IX. On the EU’s Cutting Edge 
 
Despite its divisive history, Frankfurt/Słubice has also been a leader in cross-border 
integration efforts, and demonstrates a commitment by many local politicians to promoting 
integration, a situation that may or may not translate into support by the local populace.  After 
the Polish/German border was opened to visaless traffic on the April 8, 1991, the mayors of 
Słubice and Frankfurt followed up with a “common declaration” on April 16 in which they 
further agreed to pursue economic and cultural cooperation and exchange (Słubice Municipal 
Government 2003).  The Collegium Polonicum and Europa University Viadrina also opened in 
1991, with the specific goals of “bridge[ing] the ‘East’ and ‘West,’ “break[ing] barriers and 
prejudices” between the two nations, and fostering a “common European conscience” (Słubice 
Municipal Government 2003).  The universities’ three thousand students are therefore literally 
being taught how to pursue an integrated Europe.     
 
The “Common Declaration” of 1991 was formalized on May 18, 1993 when a agreement 
was reached between the two cities, mandating a meeting schedule between the mayors, formal 
cooperation between the town councils, and economic (common water supply, sewage, and 
energy) and cultural integration (Słubice Municipal Government 2003).  In 1997, Słubice and 
Frankfurt also began developing a common urban development plan, the first transnational plan 
of its kind in the history of either country.   
 
To date, the most extensive agreement in the integration project of Frankfurt/Słubice was 
reached on July 5, 2000 with the adoption of the “Strategy Frankfurt(O)-Słubice 2003”.  
Financed by both EU and local funds, the Strategy Frankfurt(O)-Słubice 2003 is a 
comprehensive ecological and economic development and renovation project as well as a 
cultural exchange project (Słubice Municipal Government 2003).  Strategy Frankfurt(O)-Słubice 
2003 contains three main community events, the most ambitious of which is "The Europagarden 
2003," an urban renewal project to improve both sides of the Oder riverfront, to build a common 
“green” city center, and to improve the aesthetic and recreational quality of the cities (Słubice 
Municipal Government 2003).  Also included in Strategy 2003 are the XXIII International Days 
of The Modern Hanse (May 22-25, 2003), an international cultural festival in which 140 cities 
throughout Europe participate, and a joint 750th anniversary celebration for Frankfurt (12-14 July 
2003).   
The Europagarden 2003 is an archetypal example of the ways in which Euroregions 
function in concert with both local governments and other NGOs.  The Europagarden 2003 is a 
multifaceted group of events, projects and festivals, lasting from May to October 2003.  Most of 
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the Europagarden’s cultural events took place on the Isle Ziegenwerder, a small island in the 
German side of the Oder that has been developed into a large park with several performance 
venues. From June through August, almost every weekend (and many weeknights) featured an 
event, including performances by musicians from throughout Europe, films, theatre, fashion 
shows and art installations.   Many of these events were targeted simply at giving people a reason 
to cross the border.  For this purpose, two of the larger summer festivals, Johannisnacht (Summer 
Solstice, 21 July) and Oderfest (13-15 June) were held in Słubice.  Additionally, the 
Europagarden built or refurbished nine parks, six in Frankfurt and three in Słubice, and 
refinished the Słubice soccer stadium.   
 
Although co-funded by the municipal governments, a large proportion of the funding for 
these events came directly from the EU and was initially administered by the Viadrina 
Euroregion.  In turn, many smaller NGOs participated in organizing parts of the Europagarden 
such as a film festival of Polish and German student filmmakers, and a twelve-day long series of 
art projects and seminars for local youths, collectively called “Eden.”  
 
While relatively successful in many of its goals, the Europagarden has not been an 
unqualified achievement.  Many residents complain that it is too expensive, with admission to 
most events costing between EUR 3 and EUR 12.  These prices cause many people to opt for 
other entertainment, or at least to think twice about going.  In order to make up for the income 
disparity between Poland and Germany, there is a 50% discount in admission rates for Polish 
citizens, but this gesture may be more derisive than helpful as it inadvertently reinforces a 
subordinate status.  Other residents argue that the project itself is waste of investment funds, and 
that cultural events are not really achieving any real goals.  Perhaps the largest problem for the 
Europagarden project is the perception that it was organized principally as two separate projects 
which were then placed under one name to qualify for EU funding. 
 
Throughout the planning of the “Strategy Frankfurt(O)-Słubice 2003’s” events, the 
underlying theme is one of bringing the cities closer together despite their historical differences.   
These projects attempt to demonstrate that the cities are inextricably linked in both the past and 
the future, and that the EU represents an opportunity to return to this unification.  However, 
within many of the celebrations themselves, participants tended to emphasize both their 
separateness and their cooperation simultaneously.  
 
Both sides of the urban area of Frankfurt/Słubice are struggling with deciding what the 
twin cities should be and what they should become, especially as the expansion of the EU 
increases the pressure to for Frankfurt/Słubice demonstrate itself as a “Europastadt” (European 
city) and a model for the “new” Europe.  Much of the local politics of Frankfurt/Słubice is 
caught up in negotiating these decisions, and the level of integration that should be pursued 
remains a matter that is up for debate.  “Słubfurt,” one local political action group that promotes 
the integration of Frankfurt/Słubice, derives its name from the combination of the two cities, and 
promotes its use as a name for the urban area.  “Słubfurt” is of course a politically loaded term, 
and to use it for the Frankfurt/Słubice urban area is to make a political statement about the cities’ 
future as an integrated Polish/German city.  This is somewhat similar to many cities located in 
the “recovered territories,” which have both Polish and German names.  To use one name or 
another is to make a political statement about the past, and to lay a particular ethnic claim to a 
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city. Given the turbulent past of the Polish/German frontier, using a particular name can in some 
circumstances be cause for offence.  Therefore, to use the name “Słubfurt” is to lay equal ethnic 
claims to both sides of city—-a claim that does not always meet with approval by all residents.  
 
X. The Periphery’s Center 
 
Frankfurt/Słubice’s physical location causes additional struggles for significance within 
the national imaginations of the two cities’ respective countries, a placement that may help push 
the region further toward a European identity. In spatial terms, the Viadrina Euroregion, and 
Frankfurt/Słubice especially, can paradoxically be both central and peripheral depending on the 
particular context.  While its location is at the geographic heart of the expanded European Union, 
the Viadrina Euroregion is also located a long distance from densely populated and well 
developed industrial and economic areas (Krätke 1996:8).   Lubuskie’s population density is only 
about half of Poland’s average, while Brandenburg’s is only about one third of Germany’s 
average(Dascher 2003:6).  Recorded unemployment is similarly high on both sides of the border: 
17.4% in the German Border region in 2000 and 19.5% in the Polish border region. However, the 
real unemployment figure, that is, the number of people willing to work in the labor force if a job 
were available, may be as high as 30% on both sides of the border  (Dascher 2003:26-27).   
 
 In the Berlin-Brandenburg regional hierarchy (the region of Berlin is encircled by 
Brandenburg), East Brandenburg is considered part of the periphery, outside of the metropolitan 
area and its surrounding industrial areas (the so-called “bacon belt”)(Krätke 1996:11).   Indeed, 
although Frankfurt/Słubice is located on the important Rotterdam-Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow trade 
corridor, development may bypass the area, as the metropolitan areas of both Berlin and Poznań 
pull people and industry away from Frankfurt/Słubice (Krätke 1996:12).  One East Berliner who 
now works in Słubice summed up the region’s perceived location well by saying that while he 
was growing up, “Frankfurt was like the USSR.  We only looked west.” 
 
Moving west continues to be a theme among the residents of Frankfurt/ Słubice. 
Frankfurt has experienced an 18% population decline since 1990, mostly for destinations in the 
more prosperous western regions of Germany.  Over the same period, Słubice’s population has 
remained basically stable, perhaps due to the opportunities afforded by the access to the border.  
Additionally, it is extremely common for individuals on both sides of the border to make the 1 to 
1.5 hour commute to Berlin regularly for work, both legal and illegal, further contributing to a 
transience of the population.   
 
While border towns may be peripheral in national terms, they are simultaneously 
extremely important to the border regions that are central to the EU’s international policy goals. 
“Strong and fairly autonomous cross-border regions” can become centers “by combining their 
hinterlands as a Euroregion and placing its headquarters in a double town” (Parkin 2002:21).  
Since Euroregions are the focus of EU regional policies, they thus become the avant-garde of the 
EU’s integration process.  
Although both the Polish and German halves of the Viadrina Euroregion share a location 
at the EU’s center and their national peripheries, there are significant divisions within the region 
itself, and the economic disparity between the two sides presents a very real problem. 
“Convergence” between the two sides is a long way off, and there is currently a sharp divide in 
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incomes between Poland and Germany. Dascher calculates that the nominal per capita GDP in 
the German border region is 4 to 5 times the Polish side   (EUR 3965 in Lubuskie, and EUR 
16,082 in Brandenburg) (2003:10-11). Even once this is corrected for the transfer payments West 
Germany makes to East Germany (amounting to about 1/3 of the total consumption and 
investment of East Germany) and the greater purchasing power of the Polish Złolty relative to 
the Euro, the corrected average GDP per capita is still approximately four times higher on the 
German side (Dascher 2003:11-14). This represents a tremendous income inequality, and makes 
it extremely easy to associate class distinctions with the two halves of the Viadrina Euroregion, 
an association that places the Polish side in a subordinate position, and again confirms the 
perception of many Poles of being second-class European citizens.   
  
XI. Conclusion 
 
The EU recognizes border regions to be especially salient locations where integration is 
both most vigorously opposed and most obviously pursued.  Through its special attention to 
border regions in its regional policy, the EU is actively and specifically pursuing integration in 
these regions.  Within the Euroregions, the conceptions of “New Europe” and “Old Europe” 
meet, and the EU’s dilemma of resolving its vision for the future with the reality of the present is 
experienced in the daily interactions of its residents. They are also a location where the EU 
exercises its principle of “subsidiarity” and experiments with programs to promote “integration.” 
In short, they are a location where the “work in progress” that characterizes the Union’s 
governing structure is worked out.  This location truly makes the Euroregions live up to their 
place as the “laboratories of Europe.”  
 
As demonstrated by the Viadrina Euroregion, by virtue of its regional policy, the EU 
requires a reorientation of a state’s governing apparatus as well as the cooperation of a 
tremendous number of governments, each with different levels of jurisdiction.  Consequently, the 
developing spatial map of Europe demonstrates a variable geometry of governmentality and 
sovereignty across many levels, often based on the policy initiative at hand. Due to measurement 
procedures that emphasize national boundaries, regionalization in the EU is also taking on 
increasingly class and ethnic undertones.  These divisions are apparent even in the operation of 
institutions such as the Euroregions that are designed explicitly to counteract these polarities. 
  
  Because they encompass territory on both sides of the Polish/German border, the 
administrative function that these Euroregions provide for the EU creates a situation leading to 
intersecting, overlapping and sometimes conflicting areas of governance, as well as projects and 
programs that act across political borders.  Therefore, in order to accomplish administrative 
goals, cooperation and integration between levels of government are a necessity, and require the 
”pooling” and “graduating” of sovereignty. Simultaneously, as different governments and 
agendas intersect and conflict, EU policy often ends in a compromise that protects some aspects 
of a given member nation-state’s sovereignty, as demonstrated by the qualification and 
renegotiation of the Union’s major precepts of the free movement of people and capital during 
the recent accession negotiations in order to alleviate the perceived threats to Poland and 
Germany’s respective sovereignties. 
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